[anonsec] BTNS updates
Michael Richardson
mcr at sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
Sun Mar 19 22:47:12 PST 2006
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>>>>> "Nicolas" == Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams at sun.com> writes:
Nicolas> On Sun, Mar 19, 2006 at 11:49:46AM -0600, Michael
Nicolas> Richardson wrote:
>> >>>>> "Nicolas" == Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams at sun.com>
>> writes:
Nicolas> - Nodes that wish to be treated as BTNS nodes by their
Nicolas> peers should generate a self-signed cert with a randomized
Nicolas> DN.
>> Can you be more specific?
Nicolas> Do I have to be?
Give me an example of a randomized DN.
Nicolas> No, not directly, a bit of structure may be necessary, and
Nicolas> a canonical order is necessary (there can be only two, so
Nicolas> let's pick one).
I suggest sorting by IP address of initiator/responder in network order.
That's a simple sorting method.
>> Will we write a single description of a channel binding "blob",
>> or will this be application defined?
Nicolas> We will write a single description in a separate document
Nicolas> (most likely).
Good. I prefer it be similar across application uses.
>> If there are two connections between peers, such as, in some
>> cases, two NFS mounts, but certainly if I used channel binding
>> for two SSH connections for which I had a (probably-non-btns)
>> /32<->/32 tunnel, would both instances see the same binding data?
Nicolas> Most often, yes, but not necessarily.
Okay. I am concerned about this. I have a nagging feeling that the
channel binding should be made unique between users, but I'm not sure
how to do this without introducing new {IKE,IKEv2} notifies.
- --
] ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine. | firewalls [
] Michael Richardson, Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON |net architect[
] mcr at xelerance.com http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
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