[e2e] Re: [Tsvwg] Really End-to-end or CRC vs everything
David P. Reed
dpreed at reed.com
Mon Jun 11 14:42:06 PDT 2001
At 04:48 PM 6/11/01 -0400, Craig Partridge wrote:
>I think you've missed the point. In a prior note, you suggested a line of
>thinking of assume an adversary. Implicitly, that's an error model.
You're right, it's a model. But there are advantages in not forcing the
model to be statistical. Instead you can bound, say, the adversary's
computational complexity - which is what you do when thinking about a
cryptographic adversary, since inversion of one-way functions is blocked by
computational complexity considerations.
When you are trying to think through what kinds of errors software and
hardware design flaws might introduce, it helps to classify them by
computational complexity - it takes resources to screw stuff up in a
The computational complexity needed to screw up cryptographic hash is known
to be high, whereas there are computationally simple functions that can
screw up simple checksums.
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