[e2e] About the primitives and their value

Joe Touch touch at ISI.EDU
Wed Aug 9 10:09:04 PDT 2006

bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
>> Joe Touch wrote:
>>> Pekka Nikander wrote:
>>> The trick is to move the problem as close to the potential attacker as
>>> possible.
>> 2) diversify the weakness and make it a strength (SOS, our own "Agile
>> Tunnel Protocol" system and DynaBone, etc.)
>> ...
>>> The problem lies in how to distribute the "firewall information" within
>>> the network so that the firewall closest to the attack source can and
>>> will both intelligently enough filter out all or at least most of the
>>> unwanted traffic and pass all wanted traffic. 
>> That assumes trusted relationships with basically everyone EXCEPT those
>> who are attacking you. I don't think that's a defensible position
>> (either in rhetoric or in operation in the network).
> 	what was the best stratagy for winning "Life" - initally
> 	trust everyone, once "burned", never trust them again?

That's the paradox. If you never open up again, you're not running an
internetwork; you're running a closed system. But opening up again makes
attacks possible.

The only balance is to accept the fact that (as I stated in my PFIR
'bill') communication is an agreement among consenting parties, and that
- in the Internet - 'consenting' is determined by a packet exchange.


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